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Abstract
Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper o¤ers a comprehensive
analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more
participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and su¢cient for implementa-
tion. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice correspondence
can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety
of environments.
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1
1 Introduction
The main practical aim of adopting an axiomatic approach to (Nash) implementation theory is
to draw a demarcation line between which social choice correspondences (SCC s) are or are not
implementable. Drawing from the recent literature on implementation with partially honest agents
(Matsushima, 2008a, 2008b; Dutta and Sen, 2012), this paper identies necessary and su¢cient
conditions for implementation when there are three or more agents.1 Existing results on implemen-
tation with partially honest agents identify only su¢cient conditions.2
The axiomatization result is derived within the classical implementation model (Maskin, 1999),
and enriched by the following two suppositions in Matsushima (2008a, 2008b) and Dutta and Sen
(2012). Firstly, among agents involved in the mechanism, there are agents who lie to the mechanism
designer only when they prefer the outcome obtained from false-telling over the outcome obtained
from truth-telling. This paper refers to these agents as being partially honest. Secondly, the
mechanism designer knows that there are partially honest participants involved in the devised
mechanism, but does not know the identity of these participants or their exact number. These
elements modify the implementation problem in a fundamental way: The mechanism must be
designed such that, for each state of the world and set of agents that are presumed to be partially
honest, only the SCC -optimal allocations emerge as the (pure strategy) equilibrium outcomes. If
such a design is possible, we shall call an SCC implementable with partially honest agents partially
honest implementable.
The necessary and su¢cient condition for implementation is derived by using the approach
developed by Moore and Repullo (1990). It is, then, stated in terms of existence of certain sets.
To overcome the di¢culties related to the existential clauses, the paper provides simple procedures
for how to prove or disprove the existence of these sets. Their usefulness is illustrated by exam-
ining the partially honest implementability in marriage problems, rationing problems under single
peaked/plateaued preferences, bargaining problems, and in coalitional games. All SCC s considered
here are not implementable in the standard setting, and Dutta and Sen (2012)s result is silent with
respect to their implementability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal environment. Section 3 reports
our characterization result, algorithms and briey discusses its implications. Section 4 concludes
briey. The appendix includes proofs omitted from the text.
2 Notation and general denitions
2.1 Preliminaries
The set of outcomes is denoted by X and the set of agents is N = f1; :::; ng. The cardinality of X
is #X  2, while the cardinality of N is n  3. Let R (X) be the set of all possible weak orders
on X.3 Let R`  R (X) be the (non-empty) set of all admissible weak orders for agent ` 2 N .
Let Rn  R1  :::  Rn be the set of all admissible proles of weak orders. A generic element of
Rn is denoted by R, where its `th component is R` 2 R` for each ` 2 N . The symmetric and
asymmetric parts of any R` 2 R` are, in turn, denoted by I` and P`, respectively. For any R` 2 R`
and any x 2 Y  X, let I` (x; Y ) denote agent `s set of outcomes in Y which are indi¤erent to x
according to R`, that is, I` (x; Y ) = fy 2 Y j (y; x) 2 I`g. For any R 2 R
n and any ` 2 N , let R `
be the list of elements of R for all agents except `, i.e., R `  (R1; :::; R` 1; R`+1; :::; Rn). Given
a list R ` and R` 2 R`, we denote by (R `; R`) the preference prole consisting of these R` and
R `. Let L (R`; x) denote agent `s lower contour set at (R`; x) 2 R`  X, that is, L (R`; x) 
1Two-agent case is studied in Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011).
2 In a related paper, Kartik and Tercieux (2012) observe that an intrinsic motivation towards honesty of one of
participants renders any social choice function evidence-monotonic on the extended space of outcomes-plus-evidences.
3A weak order over X is a complete and transitive binary relation over X.
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fy 2 Xj (x; y) 2 R`g, while L(P`; x) denote the strict lower contour set at (R`; x) 2 R` X, that
is, L (P`; x)  fy 2 Xj (x; y) 2 P`g. For any R` 2 R` and Y  X, let maxR` Y be agent `s set of
optimal outcomes in Y according to R`, that is, maxR` Y  fx 2 Y j (x; y) 2 R` for all y 2 Y g. For
any R` 2 R`, any Y  X, and any y 2 maxR` Y , let R
p
` be agent `s weak order which has the
property that y is the unique optimal outcome in Y according to Rp` , that is, fyg = maxRp`
Y .
A social choice correspondence (SCC ) F onRn is a correspondence F : Rn  X with F (R) 6= ?
for all R 2 Rn. For each R 2 Rn, the subset F (R)  X is the set of F -optimal outcomes associated
with the conguration R. Denote the class of admissible SCC s by F .
A mechanism or game form is a pair   (M; g), where M  M1  ::: Mn, with each M`
being a (non-empty) set, and g : M ! X is a function; then,  consists of a message space M ,
where M` is the message space for agent ` 2 N , and an outcome function g. Let m` 2M` denote a
generic message (or strategy) for agent `. A message prole is denoted by m  (m1; :::;mn) 2 M .
For any m 2M and ` 2 N , let m `  (m1; :::;m` 1;m`+1; :::;mn). Let M `  i2Nnf`gMi. Given
an m ` 2 M ` and an m` 2 M`, denote by (m`;m `) the message prole consisting of these m`
and m `.
A mechanism  induces a class of (non-cooperative) games f(;R) jR 2 Rng. Given a game
(;R), we say that m 2M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium at R if and only if, for all ` 2 N ,
(m; (m0`;m `)) 2 R` for all m
0
` 2 M`. Given a game (;R), let NE (;R) denote the set of Nash
equilibrium message proles of (;R), whereas NA (;R) represents the corresponding set of Nash
equilibrium outcomes.
A mechanism  2   implements F in Nash equilibria, or simply implements F , if and only if
F (R) = NA (;R) for all R 2 Rn. If such a mechanism exists, then F is (Nash-)implementable.
2.2 Partially honest participants
For any mechanism  and any agent ` 2 N , a truth-telling correspondence T ` on R
n  F is a
correspondence T ` : R
nF M` with T

` (R;F ) 6= ? for all (R;F ) 2 R
nF . An interpretation
of the set T ` (R;F ) is that, given a mechanism  and a pair (R;F ), participant ` behaves truthfully
at the message prole m 2M if and only if m` 2 T

` (R;F ). Note that the type of elements of M`
constituting T ` (R;F ) depends on the type of mechanism  that one may consider.
For any ` 2 N and any R 2 Rn, let <R` be agent `s weak order over M under the prole R.
The asymmetric part of <R` is denoted 
R
` , while the symmetric part is denoted s
R
` .
Definition 1. An agent h 2 N is a partially honest agent if, for any mechanism , any R 2 Rn,
and any m  (mh;m h) ;m
0  (m0h;m h) 2M , the following properties hold:
(i) if mh 2 T

h (R;F ), m
0
h =2 T

h (R;F ), and (g (m) ; g (m
0)) 2 Rh, then (m;m
0) 2Rh ;
(ii) otherwise, (m;m0) 2<Rh if and only if (g (m) ; g (m
0)) 2 Rh.
Definition 2. If agent ` 2 N is not partially honest, i.e., ` 6= h, then for any mechanism ,
any R 2 Rn, and any m;m0 2 M , the following property holds: (m;m0) 2<R` if and only if
(g (m) ; g (m0)) 2 R`.
For any R 2 Rn, let <R denote the prole of weak orders over M under the prole R, that is,
<R
 
<R`

`2N
.
2.3 Partially honest implementation
Throughout the paper, the following informational assumption holds.
Assumption 1. There are partially honest agents in N . The mechanism designer knows that there
are partially honest agents in N , though she does not know their identities or their exact number.
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Let ? 6= H  2Nn f?g be a class of non-empty subsets of N . The family H is viewed as the
class of potential groups of partially honest agents. Each H 2 H then, represents a conceivable set
of partially honest agents in N . By Assumption 1, the mechanism designer simply knows that H
is non-empty, but she may not know what subsets of N belong to H and she never knows which
element of H is the true set of partially honest agents in the society. Given this interpretation,
throughout the paper, we assume that H = 2Nn f?g holds from the point of view of the mechanism
designer.
A mechanism  induces a class of (non-cooperative) games with partially honest agents f
 
;<R;H

jR 2
Rn; H 2 Hg. Given a game
 
;<R;H

, we say that m 2 M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium
with partially honest agents at (R;H) if and only if, for all ` 2 N ,
 
m;
 
m`;m

 `

2<R;H` for all
m` 2 M`. Given a game
 
;<R;H

, let NE
 
;<R;H

denote the set of Nash equilibrium message
proles of
 
;<R;H

, whereas NA
 
;<R;H

represents the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes.
Since by Assumption 1 the mechanism designer knows that there are partially honest agents in
N but does not know who these agents are, this raises the question of what is an appropriate notion
of implementation in such a setting. To enable the mechanism designer to implement SCC s with
partially honest agents, this paper amends the standard denition of implementation as follows.
Definition 3. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest (Nash) implementable if there exists a mechanism
 = (M; g) such that:
for all R 2 Rn and all H 2 H, F (R) = NA
 
;<R;H

.
In contrast to the standard denition of implementation, to achieve the partially honest imple-
mentability of F , the mechanism designer must design a mechanism in which the equivalence
between the set of equilibrium outcomes and the set of F -optimal outcomes holds not only for each
admissible state R, but also for each set H 2 H. Note that the gap between the two denitions
becomes closed when no agent in N is partially honest.
3 Partially Honest Implementation
3.1 Characterization result
When there are three or more agents, Moore and Repullo (1990) established that an SCC F is
implementable if and only if it satises Condition  dened below.4
Condition : For each F 2 F , there is a non-empty set Y F  X; furthermore, for all R 2 Rn
and all x 2 F (R), there is a prole of sets (C` (R; x))`2N such that x 2 C` (R; x)  L (R`; x) \ Y
F
for each ` 2 N ; nally, for all R 2 Rn, the following conditions (i)-(iii) are satised:
(i) if C` (R; x)  L (R

` ; x) for all ` 2 N , then x 2 F (R
);
(ii) for all i 2 N , if y 2 Ci (R; x)  L (R

i ; y) and Y
F  L (R` ; y) for all ` 2 Nn fig, then y 2 F (R
);
(iii) if y 2 maxR
`
Y F for all ` 2 N , then y 2 F (R).
Condition (i) is equivalent to (Maskin) monotonicity,5 while Condition (ii) and Condition (iii)
are weaker versions of no veto-power.6 If F is implementable by a mechanism   (M; g), the set
4Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991), Lombardi and Yoshihara (2012), and Sjöström (1991) rened
Maskins characterization result by providing necessary and su¢cient conditions for an SCC to be implementable.
For respected introductions to the theory of implementation, see Jackson (2001) and Maskin and Sjöström (2002).
5An SCC F on Rn is monotonic if, for all R;R0 2 Rn, with x 2 F (R), x 2 F (R0) holds whenever L (R`; x) 
L (R0`; x) for all ` 2 N .
6An SCC F on Rn satises no veto-power if, for all R 2 Rn, x 2 F (R) holds whenever x 2 maxR` X for at least
n  1 agents.
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Y F is simply the range of the outcome function g, while Ci (R; x) represents the set of outcomes
that agent i can attain by varying her own strategy, keeping the other agents strategy choices
xed.
The task of nding necessary and su¢cient conditions for an SCC to be partially honest imple-
mentable is particularly complicated for two reasons: First, the presence of partially honest agents
breaks down the equivalent relationship between agents preferences over outcomes and their prefer-
ences over message proles. Second, conditions on F are to be formulated only in terms of agents
outcome-preferences. Taking these di¢culties into account, we obtain the following condition,
Condition , which must be applied to any set H 2 H.
Condition : For each F 2 F , there is a non-empty set Y F  X; furthermore, for all R 2 Rn
and all x 2 F (R), there is a prole of sets (C` (R; x))`2N such that x 2 C` (R; x)  L (R`; x) \ Y
F
for each ` 2 N ; nally, for all R 2 Rn and all ` 2 N , there exists a non-empty set S` (R
;x;R) 
C` (R; x) such that for all H 2 H, the following conditions (i)-(iii) are satised:
(i) if R = R and x =2 Si (R;x;R), then (x; z) 2 Pi for all z 2 Si (R;x;R);
(ii) for all i 2 N , if y 2 Ci (R; x)  L (R

i ; y), y 2 maxR` Y
F for all ` 2 Nn fig, and:
(ii.a) if H = fig and either y 2 Si (R
;x;R) or Si (R
;x;R)  L (P i ; y), then y 2 F (R
);
(ii.b) if i =2 H, H = fhg, R = R, and x 2 Sh (R;x;R), then y 2 F (R);
(iii) if y 2 maxR
`
Y F for all ` 2 N , and y =2 F (R), then for some h 2 H, Rh 6= R
p
h ,
y =2 Sh
 
R; y;
 
R h; R
p
h

, and there exists y0 2 Y F n fyg such that y0 2 Sh
 
R; y;
 
R h; R
p
h

\
Ih
 
y; Y F

.7
Note that in the above Condition , the set Y F coincides with the set X if F is unanimous
(Sjöström, 1991).8
The novelty of Condition  is the introduction of the set Si (R
;x;R)  Ci (R; x). Whilst
traditionally the set Ci (R; x) represents the set of outcomes that agent i can generate by varying
her own strategy, keeping the other agents strategy choices xed, the set Si (R
;x;R) represents
the set of outcomes that this agent can attain by reporting the agents true preferences when those
preferences change from R to R.
Our characterization result hinges upon a condition on the class of admissible preferences, which
basically requires that the class of available proles of agents preferences is su¢ciently rich. To
introduce such a condition, for each F 2 F , let XF  X be dened by:
XF =

X if F is unanimous
F (Rn) otherwise.
The condition can be stated as follows.
Rich Domain (RD). For all i 2 N , all F 2 F , all R 2 Rn, and all y 2 X, if y 2 maxR` X
F for all
` 2 N , then there exists Rpi 2 Ri such that L (R
p
i ; y) = L (Ri; y), with fyg = maxRpi L (R
p
i ; y), and
(Rpi ; R i) 2 R
n holds.
Examples of preference domains satisfying such a condition would be the set of all proles of weak
orders, linear orders, and single peaked/plateaued non-private preferences on X. Finally, condition
7We shall refer to the condition that requires only one of the conditions (i)-(iii) in Condition  as Conditions
(i)-(iii) each.
8An SCC satises unanimity if, for all R 2 Rn, x 2 F (R) holds whenever x 2 maxRi X for all i 2 N .
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RD is vacuously satised in those classical economic environments with strong monotonic pref-
erences.9 From the perspective of the applications of implementation theory, therefore, condition
RD basically represents a mild requirement.
The following theorem states that Condition  is necessary and su¢cient for partially hon-
est implementation when the domain of preferences is su¢ciently rich (its proof is deferred to
Appendix).
Theorem. Let n  3; let Rn satisfy RD; and, let Assumption 1 hold. An SCC F 2 F is partially
honest implementable if and only if F satises Condition .
We remark that condition RD is relevant only for the case that F is not unanimous, since RD
is applied only to the necessity and su¢ciency of Condition (iii) as shown in Appendix. Hence,
the above theorem has following formulation for unanimous SCCs.
Corollary 1. Let n  3; and, let Assumption 1 hold. Any unanimous SCC F 2 F is partially
honest implementable if and only if it satises Conditions (i)-(ii).
The Theorem established above does not impose any restriction on mechanisms. However, in
implementation theory, the following types of mechansims are usually considered and sometimes
useful.
Definition 4. A mechanism  = (M; g) for implementing an SCC F 2 F is forthright if the
following property holds: M`  R
n  Y F N for all ` 2 N , and for all R 2 Rn and all x 2 F (R),
if m` 2 fRg  fxg N for all ` 2 N , then m 2 NE (;R) and g (m) = x.
10
That is, a forthright mechanism has the property that, if x is F -optimal at the state R, and each
agent announces truthfully the state R and an F -optimal outcome x, then such a message prole
constitutes a Nash equilibrium, and its corresponding equilibrium outcome should be the announced
F -optimal outcome. Because of this simple structure, the canonical mechanisms constructed in the
su¢ciency proofs of Nash implementation are usually forthright. There is no loss of generality in
relying on such mechanisms in the standard setting since Nash implementation and Nash imple-
mentation by forthright mechanisms are equivalent (Lombardi and Yoshihara, 2012). We shall now
remark that this restriction is not innocuous in our set-up.
Corollary 2. Let n  3; let Rn satisfy RD; and, let Assumption 1 hold. An SCC F 2 F is
partially honest implementable by a forthright mechanism if and only if F satises Condition 
such that for all R 2 Rn, all x 2 F (R), and all i 2 N , x 2 Si (R;x;R).
The additional requirement that x 2 Si (R;x;R) for all agents i 2 N restricts the class of
SCCs that are partially honest implementable. We shall discuss this point further at the end of
sub-section 3.3.
3.2 Algorithms for testing (non-)implementability
In this sub-section we shall derive from the complete algorithm of Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013b)
three conditions for checking partially honest implementation. The rst two conditions consist of
simple tests for non-implementability of SCC s. The third condition yields a test for implementabil-
ity and says that F is implementable if the constructed sets Si (R
;x;R) are non-empty. Hence, in
9Note that any SCC in the classical economic environments with strong monotonic preferences is vacuously
unanimous, in that there is no R 2 Rn such that \i2N maxRi X 6= ?.
10The set N can be replaced by any arbitrary set.
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order to check for implementation, it is su¢cient to construct the set Si (R
;x;R) and to check it
for non-emptiness.
We shall use the following denitions in the formulation of the conditions: For any F 2 F , and
any R 2 Rn,
Y F  Xn fx 2 XnF (Rn) j for some R 2 Rn : X  L (R`; x) for all ` 2 Ng ; (1)
and for any i 2 N , and any R, R 2 Rn, with x 2 F (R),
Oi (x;R;R
) 

z 2 Y F nF (R) j z 2 L (Ri; x) \ Y
F  L (Ri ; z) , z 2 max
R
`
Y F for all ` 2 Nn fig

,
(2)
Qi (x;R;R
) 

z 2 F (R) j z 2 L (Ri; x) \ Y
F  L (Ri ; z) , z 2 max
R
`
Y F for all ` 2 Nn fig

,
and
Vi (x;R;R
) 

z 2 Y F j z 2 L (Ri; x) \ Y
F  L (Ri ; z) , z =2 max
R
`
Y F for some ` 2 Nn fig

.
The rst condition is useful as a rst step in checking for non-implementability and concerns
the violation of Condition (iii). This condition can be formulated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let Rn satisfy RD. If F 2 F satises Condition , then
(i) Y F  Y F ;
(ii) for all R 2 Rn, and all x 2 Y F , if x 2 maxR`
Y F for all ` 2 N , then x 2 F (Rpi ; R i) for all
i 2 N .
If an SCC has the properties of Lemma 1(i) and Lemma 1(ii), then either implementability or
non-implementability may take place. In these cases, it is convenient to have a more powerful test
for non-implementability. Here is one that is frequently useful.
Lemma 2. Let Rn satisfy RD. For all F 2 F , all R;R 2 Rn, with x 2 F (R), and all i 2 N , if
F satises Condition , then there exists y 2 L (Ri; x), with (y; x) 2 R
, such that y 2 F (R) or
y =2 maxR
`
Y F for some ` 2 Nn fig.
Let us now discuss this result: The contrapositive of the above lemma gives us the following easy
way for checking non-implementability. If the set union of the sets Qi (x;R;R
) and Vi (x;R;R
)
is empty, then F violates Condition (ii.a). We shall exploit this result in the next sub-section.
Let us devise an auxiliary result to guide us in the formulation of our last condition. Before
stating this auxiliary result a little more notation is needed: For any i 2 N , and any R 2 Rn, with
x 2 F (R), dene the set Oi (x;R;R) as follows.
Oi (x;R;R) 

z 2 XnF (R) j Ci (R; x)  L (Ri; z) , z 2 max
R`
Y F for all ` 2 Nn fig

.
Lemma 3. For all F 2 F , all R 2 Rn, with x 2 F (R), and all i 2 N , if F satises Condition
 and the set Oi (x;R;R) is non-empty, then x 2 Si (R;x;R) and for all ` 2 Nn fig, x =2
S` (R;x;R)  L (P`; x) and the set O` (x;R;R) is empty.
The usefulness of this result is twofold. First, it partially characterizes the structure of the set
Si (R;x;R) by showing under what conditions this set contains the F -optimal outcome x. Second,
when read in combination with Corollary 2, it says that F is not partially honest implementable
by any forthright mechanisms when the set Oi (x;R;R) is not empty for some agent i.
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We shall now present a deeper, more useful, and more interesting method for checking imple-
mentability based on information derived from the above lemmata. We construct the sets Y F ,
Ci (R; x) and Si (R
;x;R) of Condition  explicitly in the following way.
Take any F 2 F . For any R 2 Rn, with x 2 F (R), let us distinguish the following two cases.
Case I There exists at most one agent j 2 N such that Oj (x;R;R) 6= ?.
Case II Any other case.
For any R,R 2 Rn, with x 2 F (R), let Y F  Y F ; furthermore, for any i 2 N , dene the set
Ci (R; x) as follows:
Ci (R; x) 

L (Ri; x) \ Y
F if Case I; 
L (Ri; x) \ Y
F

n Oi (x;R;R) if Case II;
nally, for any i 2 N , dene the set Si (R
;x;R) as follows:
1. if y 2 Ci (R; x)  L (R

i ; y) and y 2 maxR` Y
F for all ` 2 Nn fig, then:
(a) if R = R, then:
i. if there exists a unique agent j 2 Nn fig such that Oj (x;R;R) 6= ?, then Si (R
;x;R) =
L (Pi; x);
ii. otherwise, Si (R
;x;R) = fxg [Qi (x;R;R
);
(b) if R 6= R, then
Si (R
;x;R) =

Qi (x;R;R
) if Qi (x;R;R
) 6= ?;
Vi (x;R;R
) otherwise;
2. otherwise,
(a) if R = R and there exists a unique agent j 2 Nn fig such that Oj (x;R;R) 6= ?, then
Si (R
;x;R) = L (Pi; x) \ Ci (R; x);
(b) otherwise, Si (R
;x;R) = Ci (R; x),
where
Qi (x;R;R
) 

z 2 F (R) j z 2 Ci (R; x)  L (R

i ; z) , z 2 max
R
`
Y F for all ` 2 Nn fig

, (3)
and
Vi (x;R;R
) 

z 2 Ci (R; x) j Ci (R; x)  L (R

i ; z) , z =2 max
R
`
Y F for some ` 2 Nn fig

. (4)
Now, we prove that the above construction really performs the task for which it was intended.
Lemma 4. Let Rn satisfy RD. F 2 F satises Condition  if
(i) the above construction of Si (R
;x;R) is non-empty for all i 2 N , all R;R 2 Rn, with
x 2 F (R), and
(ii) for all R 2 Rn and all x 2 Y F such that x 2 maxR`
Y F for all ` 2 N , x 2 F (Rpi ; R i) for all
i 2 N .
We shall remark that in the preceding lemma the requirement that the domain is su¢ciently rich
and the premises in part (ii) can be dropped for unanimous SCC.
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It should be realized that if F passes the tests of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, and if for any
two proles R and R such that x is F -optimal at R and the set Si (R
;x;R) constructed as
above is non-empty for each agent i, then we can be assured of implementability of F . Then, to
check for implementability, care needs to be exercised to check non-emptiness of the constructed
set Si (R
;x;R), in particular for cases (1.a.i), (1.b), and (2.a). For cases (1.a.i) and (2.a), non-
emptiness of Si (R
;x;R) is not assured only for the case that x is the worst outcome for agent
i at R. For case (1.b), non-emptiness is assured if either the set Qi (x;R;R
) or Vi (x;R;R
) is
non-empty. In view of its pratical importance, we shall exploit extensively Lemma 4 in the next
sub-section.
3.3 Implications
In this subsection, we shall blend the results of sub-section 3.1 and sub-section 3.2 and derive a
number of propositions in marriage problems, rationing problems under single peaked/plateaued
preferences, bargaining problems, and in coalitional games. All positive results presented here
cannot be reaped from the conventional implementation setting (Maskin, 1999), and from Dutta
and Sen (2012)s result. The reason is that all SCC s studied here violate monotonicity and no
veto-power.
3.3.1 Applications to marriage problems
A marriage problem is an ordered triplet (M;W;R), where M and W are two non-empty and
disjoint nite sets such that M [W = N , with cardinality n = jW [M j  3, while R is a prole
such that Rj is a linear order on W [ fjg if j 2 M or on M [ fjg if j 2 W .
11 A matching '
on W [M is a one-to-one correspondence from the set W [M onto itself of order two (that is,
'2 (j) = j) having the following properties: a) for any m 2M , ' (m) 6= m implies ' (m) 2W , and
b) for any w 2W , ' (w) 6= w implies ' (w) 2M . Let us denote the set of all matchings on W [M
byM. In the context of marriage problems, the set of outcomes X is the set of feasible matchings
M.
Given any m 2M and any Rm on W [ fmg, Rm can be extended to the setM as follows: for
all ','0 2M, (' (m) ; '0 (m)) 2 Rm if and only if (';'
0) 2 Rm. Abusing notation, hereafter we use
Rm to represent both. The same can be done for each w 2 W . P
n denotes the set of admissible
proles of preferences for women and men. In what follows, we consider a situation in which the
mechanism designer does not know agents preferences. This situation is modeled by the quadruple
(M;W;M;Pn), which we refer to as a class of marriage problems.
A matching ' is blocked by agent i under R if (i; ' (i)) 2 Pi. Furthermore, a matching ' is
blocked by a pair (m;w) under R if
(w;' (m)) 2 Pm and (m;' (w)) 2 Pw.
A matching ' is stable under R if it is not blocked by any individual or any pair. For any R 2 Pn,
dene the stable SCC St (R) as the set of all stable matchings under R. A stable matching
'RM 2 St (R) under R is the man-optimal stable matching for R if
for all m 2M :
 
'RM (m) ; ' (m)

2 Rm for all ' 2 St (R) .
The woman-optimal stable matching for R, 'RW , is dened similarly. StM (StW ) denotes the man-
optimal (woman-optimal) stable SCC, that is, StM (R) = '
R
M (StW (R) = '
R
W ) for all R 2 P
n. The
optimal-man (optimal-women) stable SCC is a proper sub-correspondence of the stable SCC.12 A
11A linear order over a set Z is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation over Z.
12 If F and F 0 are SCC s such that F 0 (R)  F (R) for all R 2 Rn, then we say that F 0 is a sub-correspondence of
F . If furthermore F 0 (R) 6= F (R) for some R 2 Rn, then F 0 is a proper sub-correspondence of F .
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matching ' is Pareto optimal under R if there is no other matching 0 such that ('0 (i) ; ' (i)) 2 Ri
for all i 2M [W and ('0 (i) ; ' (i)) 2 Pi for some i 2M [W . For any R 2 P
n, dene the Pareto
Optimal SCC PO (R) as the set of all Pareto optimal matchings under R.
Consider the class of marriage problems with singles, where being single is a feasible choice
and is not necessarily always the last choice of every agent. Within the traditional framework
of implementation theory, it is known that the man-optimal (resp. woman-optimal) stable SCC
violates monotonicity and no veto-power. Roth (1982) showed that no selection of the stable SCC
is strategy-proof, whilst Kara and Sönmez (1996) showed that no proper sub-correspondence of the
stable correspondence is implementable. In contrast with these results, however, the man-optimal
(resp. woman-optimal) stable SCC on the class of marriage problems with singles is partially honest
implementable, which is provided below.
Proposition 1. Let (M;W;M;Pn) be any class of marriage problems with singles. The StM 2 F
satises Condition .
Proof. Since StM is a unanimous SCC, let M = Y
StM . Since StM (R) 2 PO (R), then
Oi (';R;R) = ? for all i 2 N . Following the algorithm of Lemma 4, let Ci (R;')  L (Ri; ')
for any (R;R; '; i) 2 Pn  Pn M  N , with ' 2 StM (R). Moreover, by case (1.a.ii) of the
algorithm, Si (R;';R) = f'g for all i 2 N . Finally, to apply Lemma 4, we shall only conrm that
Si (R
;x;R) is non-empty for case (1.b).
For any (R;R; '; i) 2 Pn  Pn M  N , with R 6= R and ' = StM (R), let us suppose
that '0 2 Ci (R;')  L (R

i ; '
0), and M  L

Rj ; '
0

for all j 2 Nn fig. We show that '0 2
Qi (';R;R
). Assume, to the contrary, that '0 =2 Qi (';R;R
) which implies that '0 =2 StM (R
).
Since '0 cannot be blocked by any individual or any pair, that is, '0 2 St (R), we have that for some
'00 2 St (R) and some k 2M , ('00 (k) ; '0 (k)) 2 P k . By our suppositions, i is the unique man such
that ('00 (i) ; '0 (i)) 2 P i , otherwise we fall into a contradiction. We also have that '
00 (i) 2 W ,
otherwise, '0 =2 St (R), which is a contradiction. Since '00 (i) = q 2 W and '00 (i) 6= '0 (i),
('0 (q) ; '00 (q)) 2 P q , otherwise, either '
0 (i) = '00 (i) = q or '0 =2 maxRq M, and so we fall into
a contradiction in either case. Given that ('0 (q) ; '00 (q)) 2 P q and '
00 2 St (R), it follows that
'0 (q) = k0 2Mn fig, and so (k0; '00 (q)) 2 P q and '
0 (k0) = q. Given thatM L
 
Rk0 ; '
0

, we have
also that (q; '00 (k0)) 2 P k0 . Therefore, (q; '
00 (k0)) 2 P k0 and (k
0; '00 (q)) 2 P q , and so the matching
'00 is blocked by the pair (k0; q), which gives us a contradiction. Thus, '0 2 Qi (';R;R
). The
statement follows from lemma 4.
Since by symmetry the parallel result holds for the woman-optimal stable SCC, StW , the fol-
lowing corollary is readily obtained from Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.
Corollary 3. Let (M;W;M;Pn) be any class of marriage problems with singles; suppose that
Assumption 1 holds. The man-optimal (resp. woman-optimal) stable SCC is partially honest
implementable.
On the class of pure marriage problems, where being single is not a feasible choice or it is always
the last choice of every agent, Tadenuma and Toda (1998) established the impossibility theorem
that there exists no single-valued sub-correspondence of the stable SCC that is implementable
whenever there are at least three men and three women. Their impossibility result no longer holds
when agents have intrinsic preferences towards honesty, since the man-optimal (resp. woman-
optimal) stable SCC on pure marriage problems satises Condition , which is shown analogously
to the proof of Proposition 1. Therefore:
Corollary 4. Let (M;W;M;Pn) be any class of pure marriage problems, with jM j = jW j  2;
suppose that Assumption 1 holds. There exists a single-valued sub-correspondence of St that is
partially honest implementable.
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3.3.2 Applications to rationing problems under single peaked/plateaued preferences
The following model can be regarded as a model of rationing problems (Sprumont, 1991; Thomson,
1994). A social endowment M 2 R++ of an innitely divisible commodity has to be allocated
among a set of agents N , which has cardinality n  3. Each agent i 2 N is equipped with a
continuous and single peaked preference dened over the interval [0;M ]: This means that there is a
real number in [0;M ], denoted p (Ri), and called peak amount, such that for each pair xi; x
0
i 2 [0;M ],
if x0i < xi  p (Ri) or p (Ri)  xi < x
0
i, then (xi; x
0
i) 2 Pi. Given xi 2 [0;M ], let ri (xi) be the
consumption bundle on the other side of agent is peak amount that she nds indi¤erent to xi if
such consumption exists; otherwise, it gives the endpoint of [0;M ] on the other side of her peak
amount. For each agent i, Rspi denotes the class of all preference relations on [0;M ] that satisfy
continuity and single peakedness. Whenever the social endowment is kept xed, we simply refer
to an economy as a list R  (Ri)i2N 2 R
n
sp. p (R) denotes the prole of peak amounts of R,
(p (Ri))i2N . A feasible allocation is a list x  (xi)i2N 2 R
n
+ such that
P
xi = M .
13 Note that we
do not assume that the commodity can be disposed of. Let X 

x 2 Rn+j
P
xi =M
	
be the set
of feasible allocations.14 Note that the set of feasible allocation X is the n-fold product of [0;M ].
Note that each Ri is private in that whose domain is not X but [0;M ]. Hence, without loss of
generality, when we say L (Ri; x) = X, it implies that L (Ri; xi) = [0;M ].
In what follows, we consider a situation in which the mechanism designer does not know agents
preferences. This situation is modeled by the triple
 
N;X;Rnsp

, which we refer to as a class of
rationing problems with single peaked preferences.
A number of SCC s that have been frequently discussed in the literature violate monotonicity
and no veto-power. Some of these SCC s are the following ones (Thomson, 1995).
Proportional SCC, PR: For all R 2 Rnsp, x = PR (R) if x 2 X, and (i) when
P
p (xi)  0, and
there exists  2 R+ such that for all i 2 N , xi = p (Ri); and (ii) when
P
p (xi) = 0, xi =
 
M
n

for
all i 2 N .
Equal Distance SCC, ED : For all R 2 Rnsp, x = ED (R) if x 2 X, and (i) when
P
p (xi) M , and
there exists d 2 R+ such that for all i 2 N , xi = max f0; p (Ri)  dg; and (ii) when
P
p (xi) M ,
and there exists d 2 R+ such that for all i 2 N , xi = p (Ri) + d.
Equal Sacrice SCC, ES : For all R 2 Rnsp, x = ES (R) if x 2 X, and (i) when
P
p (xi)  M , and
there exists  2 R+ such that for all i 2 N , ri (xi) xi  , strict inequality holding only if xi = 0;
and (ii) when
P
p (xi) M , and there exists  2 R+ such that for all i 2 N , xi   ri (xi) = .
Since the above SCC s do not satisfy monotonicity, they are not implementable in the standard
framework. Moreover, since they violate no veto-power, Dutta and Sen (2012)s result does not
apply. A natural question, then, is whether or not these SCC s are partially honest implementable.
Proposition 3. Let
 
N;X;Rnsp

be any class of rationing problems with single peaked preferences.
The PR on Rnsp does not satisfy Condition 
.
Proof. Since PR is unanimous, we can set X  Y PR. Take a prole R 2 Rnsp such that p (R`) = 0
for any agent ` 2 Nn fig and 0 < p (Ri) < M and M is the uniquely least preferable over [0;M ] for
agent i at Ri. Then, by denition of PR, fxg = PR (R) where xi = M and x` = 0 for any agent
` 2 Nn fig. Moreover, L (Ri; x) = fxg by fxg = minRi X.
Let R 2 Rnsp be such that p (R

i ) = 0 and there exists y 2 X with y 2 L (Ri; x)  L (R

i ; y)
and y 2 maxR
`
X for any agent ` 2 Nn fig. Since L (Ri; x) = fxg, y = x. Thus, Vi (x;R;R
) = ?,
13When its bounds are not explicitly indicated, a summation should be understood to cover all agents.
14For a study of consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked, see Thomson
(1994).
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since y 2 maxR
`
X for ` 2 Nn fig. However, since p (R` ) = 0 = y` holds for any ` 2 Nn fig
by y = x, fzg = PR (R) holds, where z` =
M
n
for all ` 2 N . Thus, y =2 PR (R), and so
y 2 Oi (x;R;R
) and y =2 Qi (x;R;R
). Then, fxg = L (Ri; x), y = x, and y =2 Qi (x;R;R
) imply
that Qi (x;R;R
) [ Vi (x;R;R
) = ?. The statement follows from Lemma 2.
Proposition 4. Let
 
N;X;Rnsp

be any class of rationing problems with single peaked preferences.
The ED on Rnsp satises Condition 
.
Proof. Since ED is a unanimous SCC, let Y ED  X. Since ED is single-valued and Pareto
optimal, then Oi (x;R;R) = ? for all i 2 N . Then, following the algorithm of Lemma 4, for any
R 2 Rnsp and any x 2 ED (R), Ci (R; x)  L (Ri; x) for each i 2 N . Moreover, by case (1.a.ii) of the
algorithm, Si (R;x;R) = fxg for all i 2 N . Finally, to apply Lemma 4, we shall only conrm that
Si (R
;x;R) is non-empty for case (1.b). Take any R, R 2 Rnsp, with x 2 ED (R), and suppose
that y 2 L (Ri; x)  L (R

i ; y) and y 2 maxR` X for any agent ` 2 Nn fig.
If xi = M , then p (Ri) = M . For otherwise, there should be d > 0 such that p (Ri) + d = M ,
which also implies x` = p (R`) + d for any other ` 6= i, that is a contradiction. Moreover, if
p (Ri) = M , then p (R`) = 0 for any other ` 6= i. Indeed, if p (Rj) > 0, then there should be
d > 0 such that xj  p (Rj)   d. Then, xi = p (Ri)   d < M holds, which is a contradiction.
Thus, if xi = M , then x is the unanimous allocation at R. Thus, since L (Ri; x) = X, it follows
from y 2 L (Ri; x)  L (R

i ; y) and y 2 maxR` X for any agent ` 2 Nn fig that y is the unanimous
allocation at R. Hence, y 2 ED (R). Thus, if xi =M , then y 2 Qi (x;R;R
) = Si (R
;x;R).
Let xi < M . If p (Ri) = xi, then L (Ri; x) = X, which implies that y is the unanimous allocation
at R as the same reasoning as the case of xi =M . Thus, let p (Ri) 6= xi. Without loss of generality,
let xi < ri (xi). Suppose that p (R

i ) 2 [0; xi][ [ri (xi) ;M ]. Then, L (Ri; x)  L (R

i ; y) implies that
yi = p (R

i ). Thus, by unanimity, y 2 ED (R
), which implies y 2 Qi (x;R;R
) = Si (R
;x;R).
Thus, let us consider the case that p (Ri ) 2 (xi; ri (xi)). Then, yi 2 fxi; ri (xi)g must hold by
y 2 L (Ri; x)  L (R

i ; y). In this case, since y` = p (R

` ) for any agent ` 2 Nn fig and yi 6= p (R

i ),
y =2 ED (R) holds. Thus, y =2 Qi (x;R;R
). Then, even if Qi (x;R;R
) = ?, there always exists
z 2 X with zi 2 fxi; ri (xi)g and there is at least one agent j 6= i such that z =2 maxRj X. This
implies Vi (x;R;R
) 6= ?. The same argument applies if ri (xi) does not exist. The statement
follows from lemma 4.
Proposition 5. Let
 
N;X;Rnsp

be any class of rationing problems with single peaked preferences;
suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The ES on Rnsp satises Condition 
.
Proof. Since the proof can be obtained as in the proof of Proposition 4, we shall omit it here.
Combining with Corollary 1, the above propositions can be summarized as follows.
Corollary 5. Let
 
N;X;Rnsp

be any class of rationing problems with single peaked preferences;
suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, ED and ES are partially honest implementable, while
PR is not.
Single plateaued preferences generalize single peaked preferences by allowing for multiple peak
amounts. Formally, for each agent i 2 N , the preference relation Ri dened on [0;M ] is called single
plateaued when there exist two numbers xi; xi 2 [0;M ] such that xi  xi and for all xi; yi 2 [0;M ]:
(i) if xi < yi  xi or xi > yi  xi, then (y
0; x0) 2 Pi for any x
0; y0 2 X, with x0i = xi and y
0
i = yi;
(ii) if xi; yi 2 [xi; xi], then (x
0; y0) 2 Ii for any x
0; y0 2 X, with x0i = xi and y
0
i = yi. The interval
p (Ri)  [xi; xi] is the plateau of Ri, where x is the left end-point of the plateau of Ri, and x is the
right end-point. For each agent i, Rspi denotes the class of all preference relations on [0;M ] that
satisfy continuity and single plateauedness. Let Rnsp be the class of admissible preference proles.
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With obvious adaptations, the notation spelled out above for single peaked preferences is carried
over single plateaued preferences.
Single plateaued preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, public good
economies, and matching problems. Since Maskins original result, it is known that the Pareto
Optimal SCC is monotonic and satises no veto-power when the class of admissible preference
proles consists only of single peaked preferences. This conclusion does not extend, however, to
single plateaued preferences since this SCC satises neither monotonicity nor Condition (ii) of
Moore and Repullo (1990). In what follows, we show that the Pareto Optimal SCC (on Rnsp) is not
yet implementable even in the case that there are partially honest individuals.
Pareto SCC, PO : For all R 2 Rnsp, PO (R)  fx 2 XjThere is no y 2 X: (y; x) 2 Ri for all i 2 N
and (y; x) 2 Pi for some i 2 Ng.
Proposition 6. Let

N;X;Rnsp

be any class of rationing problems with single plateaued pref-
erences; suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The PO on Rnsp does not satisfy Condition 
.
Proof. Since PO is unanimous, we can set X = Y PO. In what follows, let us suppose that
n = 3 and M = 1. Let R  (R1; R2; R3) 2 R
n
sp be such that p (R) =
 
1
4 ; 1; [0; 1]

. Then, 
1
6 ;
5
6 ; 0

2 PO (R). For the sake of brevity, let x 
 
1
6 ;
5
6 ; 0

. Let R 2 Rnsp be such that R

 2 =
R 2 , and R

2 6= R2 with p (R

2) =

0; 56

. Then, for each j = 2; 3, L

Rj ; x

= X; moreover,
x 2 L (R1; x) = L (R

1; x), where L (R

1; x) =

z 2 X j 0  z1 
1
6 or r1 (x1)  z1  1
	
.15 Then,
x =2 PO (R), since y =
 
1
4 ;
1
2 ;
1
4

Pareto-dominates x at R. Thus, x =2 Qi (x;R;R
). Moreover,
take any z 2 X such that L (R1; x)  L (R

1; z) and L

Rj ; z

= X for each j = 2; 3. This
implies z1 2

1
6 ; r1 (x1)

by R1 = R1. However, by p (R

2) =

0; 56

, z1 =
1
6 must hold. Hence, y
Pareto-dominates z at R. Thus, Qi (x;R;R
) = ?.
Suppose z 2 Vi (x;R;R
). Then, z1 =
1
6 or z1 = r1 (x1). Let z1 =
1
6 . Then, z2 + z3 =
5
6 must
hold, which implies that L

Rj ; z

= X for each j = 2; 3 from p (R2) =

0; 56

and p (R3) = [0; 1],
a contradiction. Thus, let z1 = r1 (x1). Since r1 (x1) >
1
4 , we have z2 + z3 <
3
4 . This implies that
L

Rj ; z

= X for each j = 2; 3, a contradiction. Thus, Vi (x;R;R
) = ?. The statement follows
from Lemma 2.16
As a direct corollary of Proposition 6 and Corollary 1, we have the following result.
Corollary 6. Let

N;X;Rnsp

be any class of rationing problems with single plateaued pref-
erences; suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the PO on Rnsp is not partially honest imple-
mentable.
Note that neither rationing problems with single peaked nor with single plateaued preferences
satisfy condition RD, because of the private preference property of those domains. Hence, partially
honest implementability of non-unanimous SCCs in those problems cannot be examined by means
of Condition .
3.3.3 On the impossibility of the strong core
A coalitional game contains a nite set of agents N with cardinality n  3, a non-empty set of
outcomes X, a preference prole R 2 Rn, and a characteristic function v : 2Nn f?g ! 2X . A
15Without loss of generality, we suppose that r1 (x1) exists.
16We also see that the Pareto SCC violates monotonicity and Condition (ii) of Moore and Repullo (1990).
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coalition, denoted S, is a non-empty subset of the set N . Given a coalitional game (N;X;R; v), an
outcome x 2 X is weakly blocked by S if there is y 2 v (S) such that (y; x) 2 Ri for each i 2 S, and
(y; x) 2 Pi for some i 2 S. If there is an outcome which is not weakly blocked by any coalition S,
then (N;X;R; v) is referred to as a coalitional game with non-empty strong core.
In what follows, we consider a situation in which the mechanism designer knows what is feasible
for each coalition, that is, the characteristic function v, but she does not know agents preferences.
This situation is modeled by the quadruple (N;X;Rn; v), which we refer to as a coalitional game
environment. Given a coalitional game environment (N;X;Rn; v), the strong core correspondence
CS is dened as the SCC on Rn with
CS (R) 

x 2 v (N) jx is not weakly blocked by any coalition S 2 2Nn f?g
	
.
We say that (N;X;Rn; v) is a coalitional game environment with non-empty strong core if CS (R) 6=
? for each R 2 Rn.
It is well-known that the strong core correspondence CS violates monotonicity and no veto-
power. This SCC is not, therefore, implementable. Moreover, Dutta and Sen (2012)s result is
silent with respect to the partially honest implementability of the strong core. A natural question,
then, is whether or not the strong core is implementable when agents have intrinsic preferences
towards honesty. A negative answer is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Let (N;X;Rn; v) be any coalitional environment with non-empty strong core.
The CS 2 F does not satisfy Condition .
Proof. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let us suppose that N = f1; 2; 3g with
cardinality n = 3, X  fw; x; y; zg with cardinality jXj = 4, and fR;Rg = Rn, where proles R
and R are as follows:
R R
1 2 3 1 2 3
y; z x w y w; x; y; z w; x; y
x w; y; z x; z x z
w y w; z
where, as usual, xy means that the agent in question strictly prefers x to y, while x; y means that
the agent at issue is indi¤erent between x and y. Let us dene v as
v (f1; 2g) = fx; zg , v (f1; 3g) = fw; yg , v (f2; 3g) = fw; zg , v (N) = X,
and v (S) = ? for all other coalitions S 2 2Nn f?g.
By denition, (N;X;Rn; v) is a coalitional game environment with non-empty strong core
since CS (R) = fxg and CS (R) = fyg.17 Since CS is unanimous, X = Y C
S
. Since by denition,
L (R1; x)  L (R

1; x) and X  L

Rj ; x

for j = 2; 3, CS (R) = fyg implies that x =2 Q1 (x;R;R
).
Since y =2 L (R1; x), y =2 Q1 (x;R;R
). Thus, Q1 (x;R;R
) = ?. Moreover, since there is no
outcome which is indi¤erent to x at R1, V1 (x;R;R
) = ?. The statement follows from Lemma
2.
The following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 7 and Corollary 1.
Corollary 7. Let (N;X;Rn; v) be any coalitional environment with non-empty strong core;
suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The CS is not partially honest implementable.
17An easy compuation yields that CS (R) = fxg since the outcome w is weakly blocked by f1; 2g, and y and z are
weakly blocked by f2; 3g; on the other hand, CS (R0) = fyg since the outcomes w, x and z are weakly blocked by
f1; 3g.
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3.3.4 On the possibility of the Nash bargaining solution
Let us examine the implementability of bargaining solutions: Suppose that there is a perfectly
divisible cake of size 1, to be shared among n  3 agents. The set of possible feasible allocations is
A 

(ai)i2N 2 R
n
+ j
P
i2N ai  1
	
. Moreover, we allow the lottery over A, so that X is the set of
all probability measures on the Borel sigma algebra of A with generic element x, y, and z. For each
i 2 N , let Ri be a von Neumann-Morgenstern preference over X such that there is a corresponding
von Neumann-Morgenstern (henceforth, vNM) utility function ui : [0; 1]! R+ which is continuous
and monotonic, and represents Ri in the sense that for any x; y 2 X, xRiy if and only if Ui (x) 
Ui (y), where Ui (x) 
R
A
ui (ai)dx (a). Without loss of generality, let ui (0) = 0 for each i 2 N . Let
U be the set of all continuous and monotonic vNM utility functions having ui (0) = 0 and ui (a) > 0
for some a > 0. Given this, let us take the disagreement point as d = (di)i2N  0 = (0; : : : ; 0)| {z }
n times
.
Then, a bargaining problem is given by a pair (S;d) corresponding to a prole (N;X;u;d) where
u = (ui)i2N 2 U
n and S =

s = (si)i2N 2R
n
+ j 9x 2 X : si =
R
A
ui (ai) dx (a) (8i 2 N)
	
. Thus, let
(N;X;Un;d) be the available class of bargaining problems. A bargaining correspondence is dened
as a SCC F : Un  X such that for any u 2 Un, F (u) 6= ? and the following property holds:
(1) essentially single-valuedness: for any x; y 2 F (u), Ui (x) = Ui (y) holds for all i 2 N ; and (2)
fullness: for any x 2 F (u) and any y 2 X, if Ui (x) = Ui (y) holds for all i 2 N , then y 2 F (u).
The Nash bargaining correspondence is a bargaining correspondence FN such that for any u 2 Un,
FN (u) = argmaxy2X
Q
i2N Ui (y).
As Vartiainen (2007) shows, in such cake sharing contexts the Nash bargaining correspondence
FN violates monotonicity. Hence, this SCC is not Nash implementable. Moreover, as shown
below, it also violates no veto-power, so that Dutta and Sen (2012)s result is silent with respect to
partially honest implementability of FN . However, FN is implementable when agents have intrinsic
preferences towards honesty, as provided in the following.
Proposition 8. Let (N;X;Un;d) be any class of bargaining problems. Then, FN does not satisfy
no veto-power, but satises Condition .
Proof. First, let us show that FN violates no veto-power. Let n = 3, and consider a bargaining
problem (S;d) such that S  con f(0:5; 0; 0) ; (0:5; 0:5; 0) ; (0; 0:5; 0) ; (0; 0; 1) ;0g, where conX means
the convex hull of the set X. Since S is convex, comprehensive, and compact, there is a suitable
u = (ui)i2N 2 U
n from which S is generated as the corresponding utility possibility set, as is
well-known in the literature. Then, there is x 2 X such that (Ui (x))i2N = (0:5; 0:5; 0). This x
is thus the best outcome for agents 1 and 2, thus no veto-power requests that x is optimal at u.
However, x =2 FN (u), thus FN violates no veto-power.
Second, let us show that FN satises Condition  by applying the algorithm. Let Y F
N
 X,
since FN is unanimous. By the fullness and the essential single-valuedness of bargaining correspon-
dence, Oi (x;u;u) = ? for all i 2 N . Thus, by the algorithm constructed for proving Lemma 4, for
each u 2 Un and each x 2 FN (u), Ci (u; x)  L (ui; x) \X for each i 2 N . Also, by case (1.a.ii)
of the algorithm, Si (u;x;u) = fxg[Qi (x;u;u) for all i 2 N . Finally, to apply Lemma 4, we shall
only conrm that Si (R
;x;R) is non-empty for case (1.b).
Take any u 2 Unn fug. Suppose that there is y 2 X such that y 2 Ci (u; x)  L (u

i ; y)
and y 2 maxu
`
Y F
N
for all ` 2 Nn fig. If y 2 FN (u), then y 2 Qi (x;u;u
) = Si (u
;x;u)
by the algorithm. Let y =2 FN (u). Then, for any y0 2 X with y0 2 Ci (u; x)  L (u

i ; y
0)
and y0 2 maxu
`
Y F
N
for all ` 2 Nn fig, y0 =2 FN (u) holds by the fullness property of bargaining
correspondences. Hence, according to the algorithm, we have to check Vi (x;u;u
) 6= ?. Let w 2 X
be such that the probability distribution over agent is sharings is identical to those of y, while j
receives 0 with probability 1. Note that such a probability distribution is always available over A.
15
Thus,
R
A
ui (ai)dw (a) =
R
A
ui (ai)dy (a) and w =2 maxRj Y
F . This implies Vi (x;u;u
) 6= ?. The
statement follows from lemma 4.
As a direct corollary of Proposition 8 and Corollary 1, we have the following important result.
Corollary 8. Let (N;X;Un;d) be any class of bargaining problems; suppose that Assumption 1
holds. The FN 2 F is partially honest implementable.
Note that the above proof of Proposition 8 suggests that any strictly individual rational and
unanimous bargaining correspondence dened on (N;X;Un;d) is partially honest implementable.
Thus, the Kalai-Smorodinsky correspondence is also partially honest implementable. In contrast,
partially honest implementability of non-unanimous SCCs, such as the egalitarian bargaining cor-
respondence, in bargaining problems considered here, cannot be examined by means of Condition
, since the class of such problems does not satisfy condition RD.
Finally, in this cake sharing model, we can also dene an extended class of SCCs by admitting
non-bargaining SCCs. For instance, let F
N
be an essentially single-valued but non-full conrre-
spondence such that for any u 2 Un, ? 6= F
N
(u)  FN (u) and there is a unique agent i 2 N such
that for some u 2 Un, there is xi 2 FN (u) nF
N
(u) in which all agents ` 2 N except i enjoys
xi 2 maxu
`
X. We may nd a justication of this F
N
to exclude this xi from optimal outcomes,
based on a non-welfaristic viewpoint. It can be shown by means of Lemma 3 that for x 2 F
N
(u),
x =2 S` (u
;x;u) holds for all ` 2 Nn fig. Thus, F
N
is partially honest implementable, but not by
forthright mechanisms.
4 Concluding remarks
While this paper sets solid foundations for implementation with partially honest agents, it falls
short in many important aspects. For example, while this paper specied the set of properties
that an SCC should satisfy in order to be partially honest implementable, the devised mechanisms
present the disadvantage of involving complex strategy spaces. In particular, strategies include
either whole preference proles or whole indi¤erence sets for several agents. This implies that the
message space is of innite dimension in many economic applications. Furthermore, the components
of the strategy space do not have a straightforward economic interpretation such as consumption
bundles, allocations, and prices. Therefore, there is a need to specify the scope of the analysis
reported herein away from abstract social choice environments. In this regard, the exploration of
the rich set of implications that arise from the injection of a minimal honesty to economic agents
involved in a mechanism can take many directions. One interesting direction is explored in a recent
work of Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013a) in which implementation of e¢cient SCC s by natural
mechanisms is analyzed in classical exchange economies.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Theorem
Let Assumption 1 hold; let n  3; let F 2 F ; and, let us suppose that Rn satises RD.
Let us suppose that F is partially honestly implemented by a mechanism   (M; g). We show
that F satised Condition .
First, let us dene Y F as Y F  fy 2 Xjy = g (m) for some m 2 Mg. Take any R 2 Rn
and any x 2 F (R), so that x 2 NA

;<R;H
0

for each H 0 2 H. Then, there is a strategy
mN 2 NE
 
;<R;N

such that g
 
mN

= x, given that N 2 H. Then, fxg  g
 
M`;m
N
 `


16
L (R`; x) \ Y
F for each ` 2 N . For each ` 2 N , let us dene C` (R; x) as C` (R; x)  g
 
M`;m
N
 `

;
therefore, x 2 C` (R; x)  L (R`; x) \ Y
F for each ` 2 N , as required.
Fix an arbitrary R 2 Rn, and an arbitrary H 2 H. Pick any i 2 N . Let us dene the set
Si (R
;x;R) as
Si (R
;x;R) 

g
 
mi;m
N
 i

2 Ci (R; x) jg
 
mN

= x 2 F (R) , mi 2 T

i (R
; F )
	
. (5)
Obviously, Si (R
;x;R) is a non-empty set. Moreover, let us suppose that R = R and x =2
Si (R;x;R). Then, by (5),m
N
i =2 T

i (R;F ); moreover, sincem
N 2 NE
 
;<R;N

,
 
x; g
 
mi;m
N
 i

2
Pi for each mi 2 T

i (R;F ).
18 Since i is arbitrary, this veries Condition (i).
In what follows, we rst show that F veries Condition (ii), and then show that it satises
Condition (iii) too.
To show that F satises Condition (ii), let us suppose that y 2 Ci (R; x)  L (R

i ; y) and
y 2 maxR
`
Y F for each ` 2 Nn fig. Then, there exists mi 2Mi such that g
 
mi;m
N
 i

= y.
To verify Condition (ii.a), let us assume that H = fig. Suppose that y 2 Si (R
;x;R).
Then, by (5), there is m0i 2 T

i (R
; F ) such that g
 
m0i;m
N
 i

= y. It follows that
 
m0i;m
N
 i

2
NE
 
;<R
;fig

; hence, y 2 F (R). Next, let us assume that, y =2 Si (R
;x;R) and Si (R
;x;R) 
L (P i ; y). Then, by (5), for each m
0
i 2 T

i (R
; F ), g
 
m0i;m
N
 i

6= y = g
 
mi;m
N
 i

. Assume, to
the contrary, that y =2 F (R). By our suppositions, it follows that there exists m0i 2 T

i (R
; F )
such that
 
g
 
m0i;m
N
 i

; g
 
mi;m
N
 i

2 Ii ; otherwise, we fall into a contradiction. Then, by (5),
g
 
m0i;m
N
 i

2 Si (R
;x;R), which is a contradiction; hence, F satises Condition (ii.a.2).
To verify Condition (ii.b), let us assume that i =2 H, H = fhg, R = R, and x 2 Sh (R;x;R).
Then, since mN 2 NE
 
;<R;N

, mNh 2 T

h (R;F ) holds. Thus, since
 
mi;m
N
 i

2 NE
 
;<R;fhg

,
the statement follows. Hence, F satises Condition (ii.b).
To show that F satises Condition (iii), let us suppose that y 2 maxR
`
Y F for each ` 2 N ,
and y =2 F (R). It follows that the only agents who nd a protable deviation are those in the set
H. Select any of such agents h. Moreover, by RD, let Rph 2 Rh be such that fyg = maxRph
Y F ;
and, nally, let Ih
 
y; Y F

denotes the set fy0 2 Y F j (y0; y) 2 Ihg. Since y =2 F (R
), it follows that
for any m 2 g 1 (y), m =2 NE
 
;<R
;fhg

. Furthermore, for any m 2 g 1 (y), mh =2 T

h (R
; F ),
and there exists m0h 2 T

h (R
; F ) such that (m0h;m h) =2 g
 1 (y), with (g (m0h;m h) ; g (m)) 2
Ih; otherwise, we fall into a contradiction. It cannot be that R

h = R
p
h ; otherwise, given that
(g (m0h;m h) ; g (m)) 2 I

h, (m
0
h;m h) 2 g
 1 (y), which gives us a contradiction. Therefore, Rh 6=
Rph , as sought. Moreover, by RD,
 
Rph ; R

 h

2 Rn. For the sake of brevity, let
 
Rph ; R

 h

 Rp.
Since F is partially honestly implemented by , it can be shown that y 2 NA
 
;<R
p;fhg

=
F (Rp). Then, there is a strategy mN 2 NE
 
;<R
p;N

such that g
 
mN

= y, given that
N 2 H. Let us dene the set Sh (R
; y;Rp) as
Sh (R
; y;Rp) =

g
 
mh;m
N
 h

2 Ch (R
p; y) jg
 
mN

= y 2 F (Rp) , mh 2 T

h (R
; F )
	
.
Since for any m 2 g 1 (y), m =2 NE
 
;<R
;fhg

, it follows that
 
mh;m
N
 h

=2 g 1 (y) for each mh 2
T h (R
; F ), and so y =2 Sh (R
; y;Rp), as sought. SincemN =2 NE
 
;<R
;fhg

, mNh =2 T

h (R
; F );
otherwise, a contradiction can be derived. Moreover, there exists mh 2 T

h (R
; F ) such that 
mh;m
N

=2 g 1 (y), with
 
g
 
mh;m
N
 h

; g
 
mN

2 Ih; otherwise, we fall into a contradiction.
18 It can be shown that x 2 Si (R;x;R) for each R 2 R
n and each x 2 F (R) if it is assumed that F is partially
honestly implemented by a forthright mechanism.
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Then, there exists an outcome g
 
mh;m
N
 h

2 Y F n fyg such that g
 
mh;m
N
 h

2 Sh (R
; y;Rp) \
Ih
 
y; Y F

, as sought. We conclude that F satises Condition (iii).
Next, we prove su¢ciency. Suppose that F satises Condition . Let   (g;M) be a
mechanism whereby for each i 2 N , the message space is Mi  (R
n [ S)  Y F  N , under the
specication that Y F  X, S \ Rn = ?, and there exists a bijection  : Rn ! S.19 Thus, each
agent i announces a preference prole, Ri, or an element of S, 
 
Ri

. Moreover, she announces
an outcome, xi, and an agent index, ki. For each i 2 N , and each R 2 Rn, the set of truth-telling
messages is T i (R;F ) = fRg  Y
F N . Before dening the outcome function g of , a little more
notation is needed.
Take any R 2 Rn, and any x 2 F (R). Let us dene a prole of strategy sets (` (R; x))`2N
corresponding to x 2 F (R) as follows:
Property I: if x 2 Sk (R;x;R) for some k 2 N , and x =2 Sj (R;x;R) for each j 2 Nn fkg, then
k (R; x)  fRgfxgN , and j (R; x)  f (R)gfxgN for each j 2 Nn fkg, where  (R) 2 S;
Property II: otherwise, j (R; x)  fRg  fxg N for each j 2 N .
For the sake of notation, let
j1 (R; x) =

 (R) if (j (R; x))j2N corresponds to Property I and x =2 Sj (R;x;R) ;
R otherwise.
For any message prole m 2M :
Rule 1 : If for some
 
R; x

2 Rn  Y F , with x 2 F
 
R

, m` 2 `
 
R; x

for all ` 2 N , then
g (m) = x;
Rule 2 : If for some
 
R; x

2 RnY F , with x 2 F
 
R

, there exists a unique agent i 2 N such that
m` 2 `
 
R; x

for all ` 2 Nn fig, mi =2 i
 
R; x

, then:
Rule 2.1 : if Ri = R = i1
 
R; x

, or 
 
Ri

= 
 
R

, then g (m) = x;
Rule 2.2 : if Ri 6= R or 
 
Ri

6= 
 
R

, then:
g (m) =
8>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>:
xi if xi 2 Si
 
Ri;x; R

;
xi if xi 2 Ci
 
R; x

nSi
 
Ri;x; R

, Si
 
Ri;x; R

 L
 
P ii ; x
i

;
y if xi 2 Ci
 
R; x

nSi
 
Ri;x; R

, y 2 Si
 
Ri;x; R

\ Iii
 
xi

;
z 2 Si
 
Ri;x; R

otherwise;
where Iii
 
xi

=

y 2 Ci
 
R; x

j
 
xi; y

2 Iii
	
;
19The reported indices in a mechanism are used to rule out undesired equilibrium outcomes as equilibria of the
mechanism. This type of device, common in the constructive proofs of the literature, is, however, subject to criticism
on several fronts. For a systematic criticism of the use of modulo games and integer games in the literature, see
Jackson (1992). Note that these critics do not defeat the point of our theorem, which is to draw a demarcation line
between which SCC s are or are not partially honest implementable. In addition, if we do not have access to modulo
games nor integer games, the range of SCC s that can be implemented is severely limited (again, see Jackson,
1992).
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Rule 2.3 : if Ri = R 6= i1
 
R; x

, then:
g (m) =
8>><
>>:
xi if xi 2 Si
 
Ri;x; R

;
z 2 Si
 
Ri;x; R

otherwise;
Rule 3 : Otherwise, g (m) = ~x`
(m) where ` (m) =
P
i2N
ki (mod n),20 and
~x`
(m) =
8>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>:
x^
if x`
(m) 2 max
R^`
Y F for all ` 2 N , where R^ = R`
(m) 2 Rn, x`
(m) =2 F

R^

,
and x^ 2 S`(m)

R^;x`
(m);

R^p
`(m); R^ `(m)

\ I^`(m)
 
x`
(m); Y F

;
x`
(m) otherwise.
where Y F  L

R^p
`(m); x
`(m)

= L

R^`(m); x
`(m)

, and max
R^
p
`(m)
Y F =

x`
(m)
	
.
Observe that Rule 3 is well-dened because F satises Condition (iii), Rn satises RD, and
f`g 2 H for all ` 2 N .
Take any R 2 Rn. We show that F (R) = NA

;<R;H
0

for all H 0 2 H.
To show that F (R)  NA

;<R;H
0

for all H 0 2 H, take any H 2 H. Let us suppose that
x 2 F (R). We proceed according to whether Property I is applied or not.
Case A: Property II is applied.
Then, let m` =
 
R; x; k`

2 T ` (R;F ) for each ` 2 N . By the denition of g, the message prole
m falls into Rule 1, where ` (R; x)  T

` (R;F ) for each ` 2 N ; therefore, g (m) = x. We can show
that any deviation of agent ` 2 N will get her to an outcome in C` (R; x) by Rule 2.1 and Rule
2.2,21 that is, g (M`;m `)  C` (R; x); then, g (M`;m `)  L (R`; x), by Condition 
. Obviously,
such deviations are not protable for any ` 2 N . We conclude that m 2 NE
 
;<R;H

, and so
x 2 NA
 
;<R;H

.
Case B : Property I is applied.
Then, let mk =
 
R; x; kk

2 k (R; x)  T

k (R;F ), and mj =
 
 (R) ; x; kj

2 j (R; x), for each
j 2 Nn fkg. The corresponding message prole m falls into Rule 1, and so g (m) = x. By denition
of g, we can show that any deviation of agent i 2 N will get her to an outcome in Ci (R; x), that is,
g (Mi;m i)  Ci (R; x); then, g (Mi;m i)  L (Ri; x), by Condition 
. Obviously, such deviations
are not protable for any i 2 NnH. To see that such deviations are also not protable for any
h 2 Hn fkg whenever h deviates to a truthful message, take any h 2 Hn fkg. Take any deviation of
agent h from mh to m
0
h 2 T

h (R;F ). This deviation will get her to an outcome in Sh (R;x;R) via
Rule 2.3. Since x =2 Sh (R;x;R) and Condition 
(i) holds, such a deviation is not protable. Since
m0h is arbitrary, agent h cannot nd any protable deviation. We conclude that m 2 NE
 
;<R;H

,
and so x 2 NA
 
;<R;H

.
20 If the remainder is zero, the winner of the game is agent n. See Saijo (1988).
21Rule 2.3 can never be induced in this case.
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Since H is arbitrary, we conclude that x 2 NA

;<R;H
0

for each H 0 2 H.
To show that NA

;<R;H
0

 F (R) for all H 0 2 H, x an arbitrary H 2 H; let m 2
NE
 
;<R;H

and let us consider the following cases.
Case 1 : m corresponds to Rule 1.
Then, g (m) = x. Assume, to the contrary, that x =2 F (R). We proceed according to whether
Property I is applied or not.
Sub-case 1.1 : Property II is applied.
Since each partially honest participant can obtain a protable deviation via Rule 2.2 whenever
R 6= R, it follows that R = R, and so x 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.22
Sub-case 1.2 : Property I is applied.
Then, mk =
 
R; x; kk

2 k
 
R; x

, and mj =
 

 
R

; x; kj

2 j
 
R; x

for each j 2 Nn fkg.
An immediate contradiction is derived if R = R. Let us suppose therefore, that R 6= R. We show
that this case is not admissible. First, k =2 H; otherwise, she can obtain a protable deviation
via Rule 2.2 by changing mk into m
0
k =
 
R; x; kk

2 T k (R;F ), which gives us a contradiction. It
follows that H  Nn fkg. Take an arbitrary j 2 H; by changing mj =
 

 
R

; x; kj

=2 T j (R;F )
into m0j =
 
R; x; kj

2 T j (R;F ), agent j obtains a protable deviation via Rule 2.2, which gives
us a contradiction. Since j 2 H is an arbitrary agent, and H  Nn fkg, it follows that H is an
empty set, which is a contradiction.
Case 2 : m corresponds to Rule 2.
Then, g (m) 2 Ci
 
R; x

. Since m cannot correspond to Rule 2.3, m falls either into Rule 2.1
or Rule 2.2.
Case 2.1 : m corresponds to Rule 2.1.
Then, g (m) = x. Assume, to the contrary, that x =2 F (R). We proceed according to whether
Property I is applied or not.
Case 2.1.a: Property II is applied.
Then, R = i1
 
R; x

. Let us suppose that R 6= R. Then, agent ` 2 Hn fig (resp., i 2 H)
can induce Rule 3 (resp., Rule 2.2 ) by changing m` =2 T

` (R;F ) (resp., mi =2 T

i (R;F )) into
m0` =
 
R; x; k`

2 T ` (R;F ) (resp., m
0
i =
 
R; x; ki

2 T i (R;F )) - with the caution that agent
` chooses k` so as to win the modulo game. In this way, agent ` (resp., i) obtains an outcome
g (m0`;m `) (resp., g (m
0
i;m i)) such that (g (m
0
`;m `) ; x) 2 I` (resp., (g (m
0
i;m i) ; x) 2 Ii), which
gives us a contradiction. We conclude that R = R, and so x 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.
Case 2.1.b: Property I is applied.
Then, 1k
 
R; x

= R, and 1j
 
R; x

= 
 
R

for each j 2 Nn fkg. First, notice that for the
unique agent i identied by Rule 2, either 1i
 
R; x

= R or 1i
 
R; x

= 
 
R

. Next, let us
suppose that R 6= R. Let us also suppose that k 2 H. Then, by changing mk =2 T

k (R;F ) into
m0k =
 
R; x; kk

2 T k (R;F ), agent k 6= i (resp., k = i ) can induce Rule 3 (resp., Rule 2.2 ) - with
the caution that agent k chooses kk so as to win the modulo game if Rule 3 is triggered. In this
way, agent k obtains an outcome g (m0k;m k) such that (g (m
0
k;m k) ; x) 2 Ik, which gives us a
contradiction. Therefore, H  Nn fkg, otherwise, we fall into a contradiction. Take an arbitrary
22Rule 2.2 always applies to (m h;m
0
h) since by our contradiction hypothesis x =2 F (R), and so the prole of
strategy sets (j (R; x))j2N is not dened when a partially honest agent h 2 H deviates from mh to m
0
h =
 
R; x; kh

2
T h (R;F ). We caution the reader that similar reasoning applies below.
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j 2 H; by changing mj =2 T

j (R;F ) into m
0
j =
 
R; x; kj

2 T j (R;F ), agent j 6= i (resp., j = i ) can
induce Rule 3 (resp., Rule 2.2 ) - with the caution that agent j chooses kj so as to win the modulo
game if the modulo game is triggered. In this way, agent j obtains an outcome g

m0j ;m j

such
that

g

m0j ;m j

; x

2 Ij , which gives us a contradiction. Since j 2 H is an arbitrary agent, and
H  Nn fkg, it follows that H is an empty set, which is a contradiction. Hence, R = R, and so
x 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.
Case 2.2 : m corresponds to Rule 2.2.
In what follows, we rst show that Y F  L (R`; g (m)) for each ` 2 Nn fig, and then we show
that Ci
 
R; x

 L (Ri; g (m)).
To show that Y F  L (R`; g (m)) for each ` 2 Nn fig, take an arbitrary ` 2 Nn fig and an
arbitrary x0 2 Y F . Since m falls into Rule 2.2, Ri 6= R or 
 
Ri

6= 
 
R

. By changing m` into
m0` =
 

 
Ri

; x0; k`

=2 `
 
R; x

, agent ` can induce Rule 3. To attain x0, agent ` has only to
adjust k` so as to win the modulo game. Since x0 is arbitrary, Y F  g (M`;m `). Moreover, since
m 2 NE
 
;<R;H

, it follows that Y F  L (R`; g (m)). Since ` is an arbitrary agent in Nn fig,
Y F  L (R`; g (m)) for each ` 2 Nn fig.
Next, to show that Ci
 
R; x

 L (Ri; g (m)), we proceed according to whether R = R or
not. First, let us notice that agent i can induce Rule 1 and obtain x by announcing either m0i = 
R; x; ki

or m0i =
 

 
R

; x; ki

. Let us suppose that R 6= R. Agent i can change mi into
m0i =
 
 (R) ; xi; ki

so as to obtain g (m0i;m i) = x
i if xi 2 Si
 
R;x; R

, by Rule 2.2. Therefore,
Si
 
R;x; R

[ fxg  g (Mi;m i), and so, by our suppositions, Si
 
R;x; R

[ fxg  L (Ri; g (m)).
Assume, to the contrary, that there exists xi 2 Ci
 
R; x

nSi
 
R;x; R

such that xi =2 L (Ri; g (m)),
so that
 
xi; g (m)

2 Pi. By transitivity, Si
 
Ri;x; R

[ fxg  L
 
Pi; x
i

. Then, agent i can
change mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; xi; ki

so as to obtain g (m0i;m i) = x
i, by Rule 2.2, which gives us a
contradiction. Therefore, Ci
 
R; x

 L (Ri; g (m)) if R 6= R. Let us suppose that R = R. Then,
(x; g (m)) 2 Ri. Moreover, since fxg  g (Mi;m i), and, by our suppositions, (g (m) ; x) 2 Ri,
it follows that (x; g (m)) 2 Ii. Assume, to the contrary, that there exists x
i 2 Ci (R; x) such
that xi =2 L (Ri; g (m)), so that
 
xi; g (m)

2 Pi. By transitivity,
 
xi; x

2 Pi, which gives us a
contradiction. We conclude that Ci
 
R; x

 L (Ri; g (m)).
Next, we show that g (m) 2 F (R). Assume, to the contrary, that g (m) =2 F (R). We proceed
according to whether Property I is applied or not. First, let us notice that the prole of strategy
sets (j (R; g (m)))j2N is not dened, given our contradiction hypothesis.
Case 2.2.a: Property II is applied.
Then, j1
 
R; x

= R for all j 2 N . Let us suppose that mh =2 T

h (R;F ) for some h 2 Hn fig
- where agent i is the agent identied by Rule 2. By changing mh into m
0
h =
 
R; g (m) ; kh

2
T h (R;F ), agent h can induce Rule 3 - regardless of whether agent i is announcing the true prefer-
ence prole or not, and whether g (m) = x or not. It is true even if#N = 3 andmi =
 
R; g (m) ; ki

,
since g (m) =2 F (R) by supposition. To attain g (m) or an outcome which is indi¤erent to g (m)
according to her true preferences, agent h has only to adjust kh so as to win the modulo game,
which gives us a contradiction. Therefore, mh 2 T

h (R;F ) for each h 2 Hn fig. In what follows,
we proceed according to whether #H > 1 and i 2 H or not.
Sub-case 2.2.a.1: #H > 1 and i 2 H.
Then, R = R, x 2 F (R), and (x; g (m)) 2 Ii. Since m falls into Rule 2.2, mi =2 T

i (R;F ).
Therefore, agent i can deviate to m0i =
 
R; x; ki

2 T i (R;F ) so that Rule 1 applies to (m
0
i;m i) -
recall that Property II is applied; then, g (m0i;m i) = x, which gives us a contradiction.
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Sub-case 2.2.a.2: not[#H > 1 and i 2 H].
Let us suppose that H = fig. Let us rst notice that R 6= R; otherwise, x 2 F (R), (x; g (m)) 2
Ii, and a contradiction can be derived by applying the reasoning used in Sub-case 2.2.a.1. Further-
more, mi 2 T

i (R;F ); otherwise, agent i can deviate to m
0
i =
 
R; g (m) ; ki

2 T i (R;F ) so as to
obtain (g (m) ; g (m i;m
0
i)) 2 Ii, by Rule 2.2, which gives us a contradiction. Let us suppose that
g (m) 2 Si
 
R;x; R

. Then, Condition (ii.a) implies that g (m) 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.
Then, let us assume that g (m) =2 Si
 
R;x; R

. By denition of g, g (m) 2 Ci
 
R; x

nSi
 
R;x; R

and
Si
 
R;x; R

 L (Pi; g (m)); Condition 
(ii.a) implies that g (m) 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.
Let us suppose that #H  1 and i =2 H. Then, R = R. Let us suppose that x =2 Si (R;x;R).
Then, g (m) =2 Si (R;x;R); otherwise, since Condition 
(i) holds, agent i can nd a protable devi-
ation by inducing Rule 1, which gives us a contradiction. Thus, since fig 2 H holds, (x; g (m)) 2 Ii,
Condition (i), and Condition (ii.a) together imply that g (m) 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, let us suppose that x 2 Si (R;x;R). Since, by our supposition, Property II is applied,
x 2 S` (R;x;R) for some ` 2 Nn fig. Since f`g 2 H, Condition 
(ii.b) implies that g (m) 2 F (R),
which is a contradiction.
Case 2.2.b: Property I is applied.
Then, 1k
 
R; x

= R, and 1j
 
R; x

= 
 
R

for each j 2 Nn fkg. First, let us notice that agent
k may or may not coincide with agent i identied by Rule 2 ; second, since, by our contradiction
hypothesis, g (m) =2 F (R), it follows that R 6= R or g (m) 6= x. Finally, by our contradiction
hypothesis, the prole of strategy sets (j (R; g (m)))j2N is not dened.
Let us suppose that there exists j 2 Nn fi; kg such that j 2 H. Then, mj =2 T

j (R;F ). By
changing mj into m
0
j =
 
R; g (m) ; kj

2 T j (R;F ), agent j can induce Rule 3 - regardless of
whether i = k or not. To attain g (m) or an outcome which is indi¤erent to g (m) according to
her true preferences, agent j has only to adjust kj so as to win the modulo game, which gives us a
contradiction. Since j is arbitrary, we conclude that H  fi; kg. We proceed according to whether
i 6= k or not.
Sub-case 2.2.b.1: i 6= k.
Then, x =2 Si
 
R;x; R

. We proceed according to whether R = R or not.
Let us suppose that R = R. Then, g (m) =2 Si (R;x;R); otherwise, since x =2 Si (R;x;R) and
Condition (i) hold, by changing mi into m
0
i 2 i (R; x), agent i can obtain x via Rule 1, which
gives us a contradiction. Thus, since fig 2 H holds, (x; g (m)) 2 Ii, Condition 
(i), and Condition
(ii.a) together imply that g (m) 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.
Let us suppose that R 6= R. Let us suppose that k 2 H. By changing mk into m
0
k = 
R; g (m) ; kk

2 T k (R;F ), agent k can induce Rule 3. To attain g (m) or an outcome which
is indi¤erent to g (m) according to her true preferences, agent k has only to adjust kk so as
to win the modulo game, which gives us a contradiction. Therefore, k =2 H. Since H 2 H
and H  fi; kg, it follows that H = fig. Let us suppose that mi =2 T

i (R;F ). By chang-
ing mi into m
0
i =
 
R; g (m) ; ki

2 T i (R;F ), agent i obtains an outcome g (m i;m
0
i) such that
(g (m i;m
0
i) ; g (m)) 2 Ii, by Rule 2.2, which gives us a contradiction. Hence, mi 2 T

i (R;F ).
Let us suppose that g (m) 2 Si
 
R;x; R

. Then, Condition (ii.a) implies that g (m) 2 F (R),
which is a contradiction. Then, let us suppose that g (m) =2 Si
 
R;x; R

. By denition of g,
g (m) 2 Ci
 
R; x

nSi
 
R;x; R

and Si
 
R;x; R

 L (Pi; g (m)); Condition 
(ii.a) implies that
g (m) 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.
Sub-case 2.2.b.2: i = k.
Then, H = fig, given that H  fi; kg. Let us suppose that R = R. Then, (g (m) ; x) 2 Ii;
moreover, mi =2 T

i (R;F ). By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
R; x; ki

2 T i (R;F ) \ i (R; x), agent i
can attain x via Rule 1, which gives us a contradiction. Therefore, let us suppose that R 6= R. By
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the same arguments used in Sub-case 2.2.b.1, when R 6= R, it can be shown that mi 2 T

i (R;F ).
Condition (ii.a) implies that g (m) 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.
Case 3: m corresponds to Rule 3.
It can be shown that for each ` 2 N , Y F  L (R`; g (m)) - see addendum. To show that
g (m) 2 F (R), assume, to the contrary, that g (m) =2 F (R). Given that f`g 2 H for ` 2 N , let us
consider the case f` (m)g = H^. Let us suppose that m`(m) =2 T

`(m) (R;F ). By changing m`(m)
into m0
`(m) =
 
R; g (m) ; k`
(m)

2 T 
`(m) (R;F ), agent `
 (m) can induce Rule 3 - the reason being
that m0
`(m) =2 `(m) (R
0; x0) for all (R0; x0) 2 Rn  Y F , with x0 2 F (R0), combined with our
suppositions that g (m) =2 F (R) and Rule 3 applies to m. To attain g (m) or an outcome which is
indi¤erent to g (m) according to her true preferences, agent ` (m) has only to adjust k`
(m) so as
to win the modulo game, which gives us a contradiction. Thus, m`(m) 2 T

`(m) (R;F ).
We proceed according to whether or not the following requirements are met:
x`
(m) 2 max
R`
Y F for all ` 2 N , (6)
x`
(m) =2 F (R) , and (7)
S`(m)

R;x`
(m); Rp

\ I`(m)

x`
(m); Y F

6= ?, (8)
where R = R`
(m), and Rp =

Rp
`(m); R `(m)

, with maxRp
`(m)
Y F =

x`
(m)
	
.
Let us suppose that requirements (6)-(8) are met. Then, let us suppose that x^ 2 S`(m)(R;x
`(m); Rp)\
I`(m)
 
x`
(m); Y F

; therefore, g (m) = x^, by Rule 3. Since Rn satises RD, Rp 2 Rn. Since 
y0; x`
(m)

=2 Ip
`(m) for all y
0 2 Y F n

x`
(m)
	
, Condition (iii) implies that x`
(m) 2 F (Rp). Con-
dition (ii.a), in turn, implies that x^ = g (m) 2 F (R), which is a contradiction. Therefore, let us
suppose that at least one of the requirements listed above is not met. Then, g (m) = x`
(m), by
Rule 3, and so requirement (6) is met; furthermore, by our contradiction hypothesis, requirement
(7) is met as well. Finally, Condition (iii) implies that (8) is met too, producing a contradiction.
As the above arguments hold for any H 2 H and any R 2 Rn, the statement follows.
5.2 Proofs of Lemmata
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that the premises hold. Take any x 2 Y F . Assume, to the contrary,
that x =2 Y F . Then, by (1), for some R 2 Rn, X  L (R`; x) for all ` 2 N , and x =2 F (R
n). Since for
any i 2 N , (Rpi ; R i) 2 R
n by RD, Condition (iii) implies x 2 F (Rpi ; R i)  F (R
n), producing
a contradiction. This completes the proof of part (i). To prove part (ii), take any R 2 Rn and any
x 2 Y F ; and suppose that x 2 maxR`
Y F for all ` 2 N . By (1), x 2 F (Rn), and x 2 maxR` Y
F for
all ` 2 N by part (i). Condition (iii) implies that x 2 F (Rpi ; R i) for all i 2 N , as sought.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that the premises hold. Assume, to the contrary, that for any
y 2 L (Ri; x), with (y; x) 2 R

i , y =2 F (R
) and y 2 maxR
`
Y F for all ` 2 Nn fig. Since F satised
Condition  and Ri is an ordering, there exists z 2 Ci (R; x)  L (R

i ; z). Condition 
(ii.a)
implies that z =2 Si (R
;x;R), and there exists y 2 Si (R
;x;R) such that (y; z) 2 Ii , so that
y 2 Ci (R; x)  L (R

i ; y). Condition 
(ii.a) implies that y 2 F (R), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that the premises hold, with y 2 Oi (x;R;R). Then, (x; y) 2 Ii and
x 6= y. Moreover, Condition (ii.a) implies that y =2 Si (R;x;R) and there exists z 2 Si (R;x;R)
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such that (z; y) 2 Ii. Then, (x; z) 2 Ii. If x = z, then x 2 Si (R;x;R); otherwise, Condition 
(i)
implies that x 2 Si (R;x;R). Since y =2 F (R), Condition 
(ii.b) implies that x =2 S` (R;x;R)
for ` 2 Nn fig. Then, Condition (i) implies that S` (R;x;R)  L (P`; x). Finally, since x =2
S` (R;x;R), it is also plain by the above arguments that the set O` (x;R;R) is empty.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that the premises hold. Take any F 2 F . Consider the above
construction of the sets specied by Condition . It is plain that F satises Condition (i). Take
any R;R 2 Rn, with x 2 F (R), and any i 2 N , and suppose that y 2 Ci (R; x)  L (R

i ; y) and
y 2 maxR
`
Y F for all ` 2 Nn fig. We proceed according to whether R = R or not.
Suppose that R = R, so that (x; y) 2 Ii. Suppose that there is a unique agent j 2 Nn fig
such that Oj (x;R;R) 6= ?. Then, x =2 Si (R;x;R), Si (R;x;R) = L (Pi; y), and Sj (R;x;R) 
fxg [ Qj (x;R;R). Since the set Oi (x;R;R) = ?, (2) implies that y 2 F (R), which is consistent
with Condition (ii).
Suppose that agent j = i. Then, x =2 S` (R;x;R) for all ` 2 Nn fig and x 2 Si (R;x;R) 
fxg [ Qi (x;R;R). Suppose that y 2 Oi (x;R;R). Then, y 6= x, y =2 Si (x;R;R) by (3), and
(y; x) 2 Ii, which is consistent with Condition 
(ii.a). Suppose that y =2 Oi (x;R;R). Then, (3)
implies that y 2 Si (x;R;R), which is consistent with Condition 
(ii.a). Note that the construction
is consistent with Condition (ii.b) too.
Suppose that Oj (x;R;R) = ? all j 2 N . Then, Si (R;x;R) = fxg [Qi (x;R;R). Since the set
Oi (x;R;R) = ?, (2) and (3) imply y 2 Qi (R;x;R), which is consistent with Condition 
(ii).
Suppose there are at least two agents j; k 2 N , j 6= k, such that Oj (x;R;R) 6= ? 6= Ok (x;R;R).
We observe that y =2 Oi (x;R;R), so that (2) and (3) imply that y 2 Qi (x;R;R), which is consistent
with Condition (ii).
Suppose that R 6= R. Suppose that Si (R
;x;R) = Qi (x;R;R
) 6= ?. It is plain that
Condition (ii.a) is satised if y 2 Qi (x;R;R
). Then, suppose that y 2 Ci (R; x) nQi (x;R;R
).
Since Qi (x;R;R
) 6= ?, (3) implies that there exists z 2 Qi (x;R;R
) such that (z; y) 2 Ii , which
is consistent with Condition (ii). Suppose that Qi (x;R;R
) = ?, so that y 2 Oi (x;R;R
) and
Si (R
;x;R) = Vi (x;R;R
) 6= ?. By denition (4), y =2 Vi (x;R;R
). Since Vi (x;R;R
) 6= ?, (4)
implies that there exists z 2 Vi (x;R;R
) such that (z; y) 2 Ii , which is consistent with Condition
(ii).
To check Condition (iii), take any R;R 2 Rn, with x 2 F (R), and suppose that y 2
maxR
`
Y F for all ` 2 N . Then, by the supposition (ii) of the statement, y 2 F
 
R i; R
p
i

for
i 2 N . Fix any i 2 N , and let
 
R i; R
p
i

 Rp for the sake of brevity. (2) implies that
O` (y;R
p; Rp) = ? for all ` 2 N . Then, Ci (R
p; y) = L
 
Rpi ; y

\ Y F  Y F . Therefore,
either Si (R
; y;Rp) = Qi (y;R
p; R) or Si (R
; y;Rp) = Vi (y;R
p; R) by the above construction.
Moreover, y =2 Vi (y;R
p; R). Condition (iii) is satised if y 2 F (R). Then, suppose that
y =2 F (R), so that y =2 Qi (y;R
p; R). Since Qi (y;R
p; R) [ Vi (y;R
p; R) 6= ?, there exists z 2
Qi (y;R
p; R)[Vi (y;R
p; R) such that (y; z) 2 Ii . Since Si (R
; y;Rp) 6= ?, z 2 Si (R
; y;Rp)\
Ii
 
y; Y F

, which is consistent with Condition (iii). This completes the proof.
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Abstract
To complete the proof of Theorem, we show that if m 2 NE
 
;<R;H

is an equilirbrium
strategy prole falling into Rule 3, then Y F  L (Ri; g (m)) for all agent i 2 N .
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1
1 Completion of the Proof of the Case 3 of Theorem
Case 3: m corresponds to Rule 3.
Let us show that for each ` 2 N , Y F  L (R`; g (m)). Take an arbitrary i 2 N . We proceed
according to whether x` = x for all ` 2 Nn fig or not. Before proceeding, a little more notation is
needed. Let us denote the rst component of the message m` as m`1 2 R
n [ S.
Sub-case 3.1: x` = x 2 Y F for all ` 2 Nn fig.
Let us suppose that x =2 F (R). Take any x0 2 Y F . By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

,
agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game.
We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i). Therefore, in what follows, let us suppose that x 2 F (R).
Sub-case 3.1.a: m`1 = R (resp., m`1 =  (R)) for each ` 2 Nn fig.
Then, for the case m`1 = R for each ` 2 Nn fig, Property I must be applied to x 2 F (R);
otherwise, we fall into a contradiction. On the other hand, for the case m`1 =  (R) for each
` 2 Nn fig, Property I can be applied to x 2 F (R), under the specication that agent k identied
by this property di¤ers from i; otherwise, we fall into a contradiction. Take any x0 2 Y F n fxg.
For the case m`1 = R for each ` 2 Nn fig, by changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i
induces Rule 3. To attain x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. To
attain x, agent i has only to adjust ki so that agent ` 2 Nn fig wins the modulo game. We
conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i). For the case m`1 =  (R) for each ` 2 Nn fig, by changing mi
into m0i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so as
to win the modulo game. To attain x, agent i has only to adjust ki so that agent ` 2 Nn fig wins
the modulo game. We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Sub-case 3.1.b: m`1 6= R (resp., m`1 6=  (R)) for some ` 2 Nn fig.
Let us dene the set NR (resp., N(R)) as NR  f` 2 Nn fig jm`1 6= Rg (resp., N
(R) 
f` 2 Nn fig jm`1 6=  (R)g). We proceed according to whether #N
R > 1 (resp., #N(R) > 1)
or not.
Sub-case 3.1.b.1: #NR = 1 (resp., #N(R) = 1).
Sub-case 3.1.b.1.1: mj1 =  (R) (resp., mj1 = R) for j 2 N
R (resp., j 2 N(R)).
Let us suppose that Property I applies to x 2 F (R). Then, for the case mj1 =  (R), agent k
identied by this property cannot coincides with agent ` 2 Nn
 
NR [ fig

if #Nn
 
NR [ fig

= 1;
otherwise, we fall into a contradiction. Moreover, for the case mj1 = R, agent k identied by
Property I cannot coincides with agent j 2 N(R); otherwise, we fall into a contradiction. Next,
take any x0 2 Y F n fxg. By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain
x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. To attain x, agent i has only
to adjust ki so that agent j 2 NR (resp., j 2 N(R)) wins the modulo game. We conclude that
Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Let us suppose that Property II applies to x 2 F (R). Take any x0 2 Y F n fxg. By changing
mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so
as to win the modulo game. To attain x, agent i has only to adjust ki so that agent j 2 NR (resp.,
j 2 N(R)) wins the modulo game. We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Sub-case 3.1.b.1.2: mj1 6=  (R) (resp., mj1 6= R) for j 2 N
R (resp., j 2 N(R)).
Take any x0 2 Y F n fxg. By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To
attain x0 2 Y F , agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. To attain x, agent
i has only to adjust ki so that agent ` 2 Nn
 
NR [ fig

(resp., ` 2 Nn
 
N(R) [ fig

) wins the
modulo game. We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
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Sub-case 3.1.b.2: #NR > 1 (resp., #N(R) > 1).
Sub-case 3.1.b.2.1: mj1 =  (R) (resp., mj1 = R) for all j 2 N
R (resp., j 2 N(R)).
The proof follows from Sub-case 3.1.a and Sub-case 3.1.b.1.1 if n   2  #NR  n   1 (resp.,
n 2  N(R)  n 1). Therefore, let us suppose that 1 < #NR < n 2 (resp., 1 < N(R) < n 2).
Therefore, n  4.
Let us suppose that Property I applies to x 2 F (R). Then, agent k identied by this property
cannot coincides with agent ` 2 Nn
 
NR [ fig

if #Nn
 
NR [ fig

= 1; otherwise, we fall into a
contradiction. Next, take any x0 2 Y F n fxg. By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i
induces Rule 3. To attain x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. To attain
x, agent i has only to adjust ki so that agent j 2 NR (resp., j 2 N(R)) wins the modulo game.
We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Let us suppose that Property II applies to x 2 F (R). Take any x0 2 Y F n fxg. By changing
mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so
as to win the modulo game. To attain x, agent i has only to adjust ki so that agent j 2 NR (resp.,
j 2 N(R)) wins the modulo game. We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Sub-case 3.1.b.2.2: mj1 6=  (R) (resp., mj1 6= R) for some j 2 N
R (resp., j 2 N(R)).
Then, there exists j 2 NR (resp., j 2 N(R)) such that mj1 =2 fR; (R)g. Take any x
0 2
Y F n fxg. By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x0, agent i
has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game.
To show that agent i can also attain x, let us proceed according to whether #NR = n   1
(resp., #N(R) = n   1) or not. Let us suppose that #NR 6= n   1 (resp., #N(R) 6= n   1).
Then, there exists ` 2 N such that m`1 = R (resp., m`1 =  (R)). Take any x
0 2 Y F n fxg. Let
us suppose that Property I applies to x 2 F (R). By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
R; x0; ki

(resp.,
m0i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

), agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x, agent i has only to adjust ki so as agent
` wins the modulo game. Let us suppose that Property II applies to x 2 F (R). By changing mi
into m0i =
 
 (R) ; x; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x, agent i has only to adjust ki so as
to win the modulo game. Therefore, let us suppose that #NR = n   1 (resp., #N(R) = n   1).
By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x, agent i has only to
adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Sub-case 3.2: x` 6= xj 2 Y F for some j; ` 2 Nn fig, with j 6= `.
We proceed according to the following exhaustive cases:

x`; xj
	
\ F (R) = ?,
#

x`; xj
	
\ F (R)
	
= 1, and

x`; xj
	
 F (R).
Sub-case 3.2.a:

x`; xj
	
\ F (R) = ?.
Take any x0 2 Y F . By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain
x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Sub-case 3.2.b: x` 2 F (R) and xj =2 F (R).1
Take any x0 2 Y F n

x`
	
. By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To
attain x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. To show that agent i can
also attain x`, let us proceed according to whether Property I applies to x` 2 F (R) or not.
Let us suppose that Property I applies to x` 2 F (R). Let us suppose that agent k identied
by Property I coincides with agent i. Then, by changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x`; ki

, agent i
induces Rule 3. To attain x`, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. Let
us suppose that agent k identied by Property I belongs to Nn fig. Then, by changing mi into
1The case xj 2 F (R) and x` =2 F (R) is not explicitly considered, since it can be proved similarly to the case
x` 2 F (R) and xj =2 F (R).
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m0i =
 
R; x`; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x`, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win
the modulo game. We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Let us suppose that Property II applies to x` 2 F (R). Then, by changing mi into m
0
i = 
 (R) ; x`; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x`, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the
modulo game. We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Sub-case 3.2.c:

x`; xj
	
 F (R).
Take any x0 2 Y F n

x`; xj
	
. By changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x0; ki

, agent i induces Rule 3.
To attain x0, agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. To show that agent i can
also attain x` and xj , let us proceed according to whether or not Property I applies to x` 2 F (R)
and xj 2 F (R). Before proceeding, a little more notation is needed. Let kx` (resp., kxj ) denote
the agent k identied by Property I for x` 2 F (R) (resp., xj 2 F (R)).
Sub-case 3.2.c.1: Property I applies to both x` 2 F (R) and xj 2 F (R).
We proceed according to whether or not kx` = i and kxj = i.
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Let us suppose that kx` = kxj = i. Then, by changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x`; ki

(resp.,
m0i =
 
 (R) ; xj ; ki

), agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x` (resp., xj), agent i has only to adjust ki
so as to win the modulo game.
Let us suppose that kx` = i and kxj 6= i. Then, by changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x`; ki

(resp.,
m0i =
 
R; xj ; ki

), agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x` (resp., xj), agent i has only to adjust ki so
as to win the modulo game.
Let us suppose that kx` 6= i and kxj 6= i. Then, by changing mi into m
0
i =
 
R; x`; ki

(resp.,
m0i =
 
R; xj ; ki

), agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x` (resp., xj), agent i has only to adjust ki so
as to win the modulo game.
We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Sub-case 3.2.c.2: Property II applies to both x` 2 F (R) and xj 2 F (R).
Then, by changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x`; ki

(resp., m0i =
 
 (R) ; xj ; ki

), agent i induces
Rule 3. To attain x` (resp., xj), agent i has only to adjust ki so as to win the modulo game. We
conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Sub-case 3.2.c.3: Property I applies to x` 2 F (R) and Property II applies to xj 2 F (R).3
Let us suppose that kx` = i. Then, by changing mi into m
0
i =
 
 (R) ; x`; ki

(resp., m0i = 
 (R) ; xj ; ki

), agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x` (resp., xj), agent i has only to adjust ki so as
to win the modulo game.
Let us suppose that kx` 6= i. Then, by changing mi into m
0
i =
 
R; x`; ki

(resp., m0i = 
 (R) ; xj ; ki

), agent i induces Rule 3. To attain x` (resp., xj), agent i has only to adjust ki
so as to win the modulo game. We conclude that Y F  g (Mi;m i).
Since agent i 2 N is arbitrary, Y F  g (Mi;m i) for each i 2 N . Furthermore, by our
supposition that m 2 NE
 
;<R;H

, it follows that Y F  L (Ri; g (m)) for each i 2 N .
2The case kx` 6= i and kxj = i is not explicitly considered, since it can be proved similarly to the case kx` = i and
kxj 6= i.
3The case Property II applies to x` 2 F (R) and Property I applies to xj 2 F (R) is not explicitly considered,
since it can be proved similarly to the case Property I applies to x` 2 F (R) and Property II applies to xj 2 F (R).
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